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Abstract
One of the costs of anticipated amnesties is current and future non-compliance with the law. Relatively to a 
no-amnesty situation, efficient enforcement policies may therefore differ when an amnesty is offered. To study 
this question, a model is built in which individuals impose a cost on society when they commit a crime. When a 
criminal participates in an amnesty, or (to a lesser extent) when he is caught, some fraction of the social cost is 
recovered, reflecting co-operation with the authorities. The analysis characterizes efficient anticipated amnesties. 
It is shown that the efficient level of enforcement may be smaller in the case of an anticipated amnesty than in a 
no-amnesty situation. The reason is that despite the increase in the initial number of criminals generated by the 
amnesty, many criminals eventually participate in it. If participants in the amnesty are very co-operative, then a 
large proportion of the social cost is recovered making the initial increase in the number of criminals less costly. 
The optimal level of the reduced sanction imposed on those who participate in the amnesty is also characterized.
1. Introduction
Amnesties are not frequent although they seem to have become more prevalent recently. 
In the United States, they have been given for tax evasion,1 unreturned library books,2 
parking tickets, draft evasion,3 and illegal immigration. In June 1996, following the 
Dunblane tragedy, a firearm amnesty was offered in England, Scotland, and Wales. In 
France, it is now a tradition for newly elected Pre´sident de la Re´publique to give an 
amnesty for minor violations to the law.4 There is also the case of South Korea that gave 
an amnesty to illegal immigrants in 1992, and of Canada in which there is a policy of 
granting immunity to tax evaders who voluntarily pay their delinquent taxes, an implicit 
amnesty (Andreoni, 1990). Finally, one has to note that amnesties for tax evasion have 
now been used in at least 21 countries other than Canada and the U.S.5
Studying amnesties is important because our knowledge of this practice is far from 
com-plete and because another round of amnesties is likely to take place. Indeed, it is 
reasonable to think that the conditions that made it optimal to offer amnesties in the late 
1980s and early 1990s could be met again and again in the future. The benefits and costs 
of amnesties have been described by Leonard and Zeckhauser (1987). Among the benefits 
of an amnesty, they mention the reduction in guilt of the criminals, and the smoothing of a 
transition to a regime of a stricter enforcement.6 As to the costs, they list the increased 
feelings by honest
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2citizens that the law is unfair, and the encouragement to future non-compliance as future
amnesties are expected to occur.7 This last point is probably the most important concern of
opponents to the use of amnesties. Because amnesties were so popular in the later 1980s
and early 1990s, people may anticipate that a new round of amnesties will soon take place
and modify their behavior accordingly.8 Yet, an increase in non-compliance does not per
se mean that an amnesty is not efficient (Andreoni, 1990).
Because non-compliance is expected to rise, one might think that it would be efficient to
increase enforcement after an amnesty has been offered. Indeed, Alm, McKee, and Beck
(1990), using experimental methods, found that the average level of compliance falls after
an amnesty has taken place. However, they also obtained that if enforcement is increased
after an amnesty, then the level of compliance may increase. Malik and Schwab (1991)
studied the desirability of amnesties when the probability that an amnesty will be offered
and the level of enforcement are chosen optimally. In their paper, the authority can only
select one level of enforcement, and this level will be implemented whether an amnesty
actually takes place or not. In the current analysis, the probability that an amnesty will
take place is either zero or one, and we allow the authority to select the optimal level of
enforcement in each case.
Examining the characteristics of the crimes for which amnesties are most commonly used,
one can note two things. The first one is that the authority, by declaring an amnesty, is able to
recover a portion of the social cost of crimes. For example, by declaring an amnesty, some
authorities have been able to recover evaded taxes or potentially harmful illegally owned
guns. We will show that this feature is an important determinant of the efficiency of an
amnesty. We will also show that it affects the efficient level of enforcement. Secondly, for
most amnesties, the reduced sanction imposed on participants is usually zero. This paper
establishes the conditions under which it is efficient for the authority to set the reduced
sanction at zero. Note that in this paper, we will focus on amnesties offered to criminals
which have not been caught.9 Possible examples of such amnesties are tax evasion, firearm
possession, or illegal immigration.
The main objective of this paper is to study the impact of there being an amnesty on the
efficient level of enforcement. For this purpose, we build a model in which the individuals
contemplate committing a crime that pays off some private gain but also imposes some cost
to society. To deter criminal activities, the authority invests resources in enforcement and
sanction the criminals that are caught. We suppose that when a criminal is caught, a fraction
° of the social cost of crime is recovered. For example, evaded taxes may be recovered
when a tax evader is identified.10 Note however that it is likely that the authority will not
be able to recover the totality of the social cost. For example, a tax evader may not reveal
the exact amount of his concealed income, even after having been identified. Amnesties
are then introduced. We are interested in amnesties that are desirable (in the sense that they
reduce total cost) and fully anticipated. Intuitively, the case of a fully anticipated amnesty
is a good benchmark because it is the worse in terms of non-compliance. Amnesties consist
in a criminal confessing to his crime in exchange of a reduced sanction. An important
feature of our model is that when an individual participates in an amnesty, he co-operates
with the authorities and so, a larger fraction, say fl, of the social cost of crime is recovered
than when a criminal is caught .fl ‚ ° /.11 There are several examples of co-operation in
3the real world:12 payment of delinquent taxes or return of illegally owned firearms, etc.
We then characterize the efficient level of enforcement under two regimes: no-amnesty
and anticipated amnesty. We suppose that the authority minimizes the sum of the cost of
enforcement and of the net social cost of crime.13 We then compare the level of enforcement
in the two regimes. It turns out that this comparison is generally ambiguous, but that clear
cut analytical results can be obtained for the case where the distribution of gain from crime
is uniform. We also present numerical results for the more general model.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the basic model. In
Section 3, amnesties are introduced and the private sector behavior characterized for given
levels of enforcement. The fourth section addresses the issue of efficient policies in the two
regimes. The conclusion follows.
2. The Model
Consider the following simple economy. All the individuals in the economy earn the same
exogenous income y, are risk neutral, and have the same utility function U .y/ D y. All
of them also have the opportunity to commit a crime. The gain from committing the crime
is denoted g and varies across individuals. It is distributed according to a continuous
distribution function with density f .g/ and cumulative F.g/ over support [g‘; gh]. The
gain g of an individual is private information. The authority cannot observe each agent’s
gain, but knows the distribution of gain in society. When an agent commits a crime, he
imposes a cost Z to society. We suppose that for all crime, the social cost is larger than the
private gain, i.e. Z > gh . Therefore, all crimes are undesirable.
In order to deter crime, the authority invests in enforcement fi and imposes a sanction S
on any criminal who is caught. Investing fi implies enforcement cost C.fi/, where C 0 > 0
and C 00 > 0, and translates into a probability of detection fi.14 The sanction S is costless
for the authority. For the remainder of the analysis, the sanction is assumed fixed and
exogenous. When the authority detects a criminal, the criminal’s gain g is dissipated,15 and
he is administered the sanction S. For that particular criminal, society recovers a portion
° 2 [0; 1] of the social cost Z (i.e. ° Z is recovered).
It is assumed that once an individual has committed a crime, he suffers a shock µ . Instead
of enjoying his private gain g, he gets µg. We assume that µ is random: with probability
q; µ D ‚ < 1, while with probability .1¡ q/; µ D 1. A shock µ D ‚ corresponds to an ex
post decrease in the value of the gain g. For future use, we denote the expected shock by
Nµ D q‚C .1¡ q/. Note that such a shock is necessary for the amnesty to have an impact.
Indeed, if an individual was willing to commit a crime when the sanction was large, then
this individual will certainly want to remain a criminal when an amnesty is offered and
the sanction is reduced (i.e. the cost of being a criminal is decreased), unless something
happens on the side of benefits. In the literature, the occurrence of such shocks is a standard
assumption. For example, Andreoni (1990) and Malik and Schwab (1991) introduce a
utility shock. In our analysis, the shock could also be interpreted as a utility one, reflecting
guilt or regret.16 An alternative interpretation is that the shock could reflect varying market
conditions. For example, the demand for stolen goods could have decreased or their supply
increased, these phenomena leading to a decrease in the market price.
4The utility of an individual that chooses not to commit a crime (stay honest) is simply his
income: U H D y. The utility of an individual who commits a crime is given by:
E[U C ] D .1¡ fi/[y C q‚g C .1¡ q/g]C fi[y ¡ S]
D y C .1¡ fi/ Nµg ¡ fiS (1)
Of course, an individual chooses to commit a crime only if he is better off doing so, i.e. if
E[U C ] ‚ U H . Given fi, the individual which will be just indifferent between committing
and not committing a crime has a potential private gain Og.fi/ given by:
Og.fi/ D fiS
.1¡ fi/ Nµ (2)
Since U H is fixed and E[U C ] is increasing in g, all individuals with g ‚ Og.fi/will commit a
crime while the others will not. Note that Og.fi/ is increasing in fi (and S) so that an increase
in either of these variables will induce a reduction in the number of crimes committed. Also
note that Og.fi/ is decreasing in Nµ .
3. Amnesties
In this section, we introduce amnesties. For now, we take the level of enforcement fi and
the reduced sanction s as given. The choice of fi and s will be endogenized in next section.
As mentioned earlier, we concentrate on the case where amnesties are anticipated.
Suppose the following sequence of events:
(1) The authority announces its enforcement policy, fi, and that it will eventually offer an
amnesty with reduced sanction s.
(2) Given the announced policy, the individuals decide whether to commit a crime or not.
(3) The individuals that have committed a crime are affected by a shock µ .
(4) The authority declares the (anticipated) amnesty. The amnesty consists of the following:
(a) An individual who participates in the amnesty confesses that he has committed a
crime, his gain g is dissipated, and a reduced sanction s is imposed on him;
(b) Society recovers a fraction fl of the social cost Z , where 1 ‚ fl ‚ ° ‚ 0;
(4) The individuals that have committed a crime decide whether to participate in the
amnesty or not.
(5) Detection takes place, individuals that are still criminals post-amnesty are caught or
not, and payoffs are awarded.
Note that this sequence of events implicitly assumes that the authority can commit to its
announced policy (in stage (1)), even though it might be optimal to revise the chosen policy
ex post. The analysis will focus on the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this game between
5the authority and potential criminals, taking as given that the authority can commit.17 Of
course, when making its policy choices in stage (1), the authority fully understands the
behavior of the private sector in later stages of the game.
We now analyze the criminals’ decision to participate in the amnesty. A criminal that
decides to participate in the amnesty has utility U A D y¡s. On the other hand, if he remains
a criminal and draws µ D 1, he gets yC.1¡fi/g¡fiS, and so he is better off not participating
in this case.18 However, if an individual draws µ D ‚, he gets y C .1 ¡ fi/‚g ¡ fiS, and
he may choose to participate in the amnesty. For a policy .fi; s/, a criminal that has drawn
µ D ‚will be indifferent between participating in the amnesty or not if he is of type Qg.fi; s/,
which is given by:
Qg.fi; s/ D fiS ¡ s
.1¡ fi/‚ (3)
Note that Qg.fi; s/ is increasing in fi but decreasing in s. Since U A is fixed and U C is
increasing in g, we can infer that all the criminals drawing µ D ‚ will participate in the
amnesty if they are of type g < Qg.fi; s/, while they will remain criminals otherwise.
Consider now the decision to become a criminal made in stage (1). Although the choice of
participating in the amnesty is really made after µ has been revealed, individuals anticipate
their future decisions and can therefore be viewed as choosing between three possibilities
given a level of enforcement fi and sanction s.
The first possibility for the individual is, as before, to choose not to commit a crime
and, in that case, his utility is simply U H D y. Secondly, he can choose to commit a
crime and to never participate in the amnesty, thereby obtaining expected utility E[U C ] D
yC .1¡fi/ Nµg¡fiS. Finally, an individual can choose to commit a crime and to participate
in the amnesty if he draws µ D ‚. In that case, his expected utility is given by E[U A] D
yC .1¡fi/.1¡ q/g¡fi.1¡ q/S¡ qs. Note that U H is constant while E[U C ] and E[U A]
are both increasing in g.
We already know that E[U C ] ‚ .</U H if g ‚ .</ Og.fi/. It can also be seen that
E[U C ] ‚ .</E[U A] if g ‚ .</ Qg.fi; s/. From these two facts, we can infer that an
individual with g ‚ Qg.fi; s/will always choose to commit the crime and to never participate
in the amnesty.
We also have to compare the utility of not committing a crime with that of committing one
and participating in the amnesty when µ D ‚. Let Mg.fi; s/ denote the type of an individual
who is indifferent between these two alternatives; it is given by:
Mg.fi; s/ D fiS C .q=.1¡ q//s
1¡ fi (4)
Note that Mg.fi; s/ is increasing in fi and s.
For an amnesty to have an impact, it has to be the case that .fi; s/ are set so that Qg.fi; s/ >
Og.fi/. It is possible to obtain that for amnesties that have an impact:19
Mg.fi; s/ < Og.fi/ < Qg.fi; s/ (5)
Hence, it is possible to conclude the following. All the individuals with g < Mg.fi; s/
do not commit a crime while all those with g ‚ Mg.fi; s/ do so. Once the amnesty is
6declared, the criminals that have drawn µ D ‚ and that are of type g < Qg.fi; s/ participate
in it. Those that have drawn µ D 1 and those that have drawn µ D ‚ but are of type
g ‚ Qg.fi; s/ do not participate in the amnesty. Since Og.fi/ > Mg.fi; s/, more crimes are
committed when there is an amnesty than when there is not (for an identical level of
enforcement).
4. Efficient Policies
We now turn to the endogenization of the level of enforcement and of the reduced sanction
for the participants in the amnesty. Generally, an authority can use two instruments to
deter crime: the level of enforcement and that of the sanction. When an authority declares
an amnesty, it can also use the level of the reduced sanction for those who participate in
the amnesty, s. As mentioned earlier, we suppose that the sanction S for criminals that
are caught is fixed and exogenous. In the current model, there are no good crimes (since
Z > gh) and so, the efficient sanctions are maximal (a` la Becker, 1968). We assume
that for reasons lying outside the model, they have been set at some non-maximal level
and therefore, that all crimes have not been deterred. If we were to make the sanction S
endogenous, we would need to introduce justifications for them being less than maximal;
this would complicate the analysis and would take us away from our objective of studying
enforcement and amnesties.20 However, the situation is different for the sanction s imposed
on the participants to the amnesty. This sanction should not be used for deterrence purposes;
this job is better done by the sanction S imposed on the criminals that are caught. The
problem with setting s large is that it has an impact on participation in the amnesty. Indeed,
if the reduced sanction s is very large .s > S/ and if g‘ ‚ 0 and ‚ ‚ 0, then no criminal
will participate in the amnesty.
We now formally derive the efficient policies. We first characterize the efficient level of
enforcement fi in the no-amnesty case. We then turn to its determination in the case of
an anticipated amnesty, together with that of the reduced sanction s. We also evaluate the
desirability of declaring an amnesty. We assume that the authority minimizes the sum of
the cost of enforcement and of the social cost of crime.21 This simple objective leads to
interesting results and reflects the trade-off faced by many authorities. Note that we assume
that the sanctions S and s do not yield revenues for the authority.
4.1. Case With No Amnesty
Consider first the determination of the efficient level of enforcement in the no-amnesty case.
The problem of the authority can be written as:
min
fi
˜N .fi/ D
(
C.fi/C
Z gh
Og.fi/
[1¡ °fi]Z f .g/ dg
)
(6)
where the first term represents the cost of enforcement, while the second one is the net
social cost of crime, a portion ° of the gross social cost being recovered when a criminal is
caught. The efficient level of fi, denoted fiN , is the solution to the following rearrangement
7of the first order condition:22
C 0.fiN /
Z
¡ ° [1¡ F. Og.fiN //]¡ [1¡ °fi
N ] f . Og.fiN //S
.1¡ fiN /2 Nµ D 0 (7)
Equation (7) shows that the authority faces a trade-off in its choice of enforcement. The
first term on the left-hand side is the marginal cost of enforcement while the last two are its
marginal benefit, the second term reflecting social cost recovery (through the apprehension
of criminals), and the third term capturing the deterrence effect (i.e. the reduction in the
number of individuals undertaking criminal activities).
For later use, note that the value of the minimized total cost when no amnesty is declared
is ˜N .fiN /.
4.2. Case With an Anticipated Amnesty
As was mentioned earlier, we assume that the authority can commit to its policies and that
it fully anticipates the behavior of the private sector. The problem of the authority is to
choose fi and s to solve:
min
fi;s
˜A.fi; s/ D
(
C.fi/C Z
Z gh
Mg.fi;s/
f .g/ dg ¡ qflZ
Z Qg.fi;s/
Mg.fi;s/
f .g/ dg
¡.1¡ q/fi° Z
Z Qg.fi;s/
Mg.fi;s/
f .g/ dg ¡ fi° Z
Z gh
Qg.fi;s/
f .g/ dg
)
; (8)
subject to23
s ‚ 0:
The first term of the objective function is simply the cost of enforcement. The second term
is the gross social cost of every crime that has been committed. Note that this term depends
on the endogenous variables, reflecting the fact that the authority correctly anticipates the
response of the private sector to its policy choices. Also note that all the individuals with
g ‚ Mg (rather than g ‚ Og) commit a crime. The third term represents the portion .fl/ of the
social cost that is recovered through the amnesty because the individuals co-operate with
the authority. Recall that only those that have g 2 [ Mg; Qg] and that suffer a bad shock (a
proportion q of all criminals) participate in the amnesty. Finally, the last two terms represent
the portion .° / of the social cost that is recovered through the apprehension of criminals.
Recall that criminals are apprehended with probability fi and that after the amnesty has
been offered, the criminals that are left are either those that have g > Qg or those that
have g 2 [ Mg; Qg] and that were not affected by the bad shock (a proportion 1 ¡ q of all
criminals).
We denote the efficient levels of the endogenous variables by .fiA; s A/. They are the
solution to the following rearrangement of the first order conditions for fi and s,
8respectively:
C 0.fiA/
Z
¡
µ
S C q
1¡ q s
A
¶ [1¡ qfl ¡ .1¡ q/° fiA] f . Mg.fiA; s A//
.1¡ fiA/2
¡ q.S ¡ s
A/[fl ¡ °fiA] f . Qg.fiA; s A//
‚.1¡ fiA/2 ¡ ° [1¡ q F. Qg.fi
A; s A//
¡ .1¡ q/F. Mg.fiA; s A//] D 0; (9)
Z
1¡ fiA
26664
¡q f . Mg.fiA; s A//.1¡ qfl
¡ .1¡ q/fiA° /
1¡ q C
q f . Qg.fiA; s A//.fl C fiA° /
‚
37775 ‚ 0; (10a)
s A ‚ 0; (10b)
s A ¢ Z
1¡ fiA
2664
¡q f . Mg.fiA; s A//.1¡ qfl
¡.1¡ q/fiA° /
1¡ q
C q f . Qg.fi
A; s A//.fl C fiA° /
‚
‚
D 0: (10c)
Equation (9) reflects the trade-off in the choice of enforcement. Its first term on the left-
hand side represents the marginal cost of increasing enforcement. The three others enter
the marginal benefit of more enforcement. The second term reflects the decrease in the
number of individuals that turn criminals when enforcement is increased. As for the third
term, it represents the marginal benefit of having an increase in the number of individuals
that participate in the amnesty. Finally, the fourth term captures the marginal benefit of
more frequent social cost recovery (because more criminals are caught when enforcement
increases).
The optimal level of the reduced sanction is characterized in equations (10a), (10b), and
(10c). The first term in brackets in equation (10a) reflects the marginal benefit of having
less individuals turning criminals when s is increased (because they expect a less generous
amnesty). As for the second term in brackets, it captures the marginal cost of having less
individuals participating in the amnesty when s is larger. Equations (10b) and (10c) simply
state the conditions under which the optimal reduced sanction corresponds to a corner
solution .s D 0/. This will occur if, when evaluated at s D 0, the marginal benefit of
having less individuals turning criminals is smaller than the marginal cost of a reduced
participation in the amnesty.
Note that the value of the minimized total cost when an anticipated amnesty is declared
is ˜A.fiA; s A/.
9Clearly, an authority will only declare an amnesty if it is desirable (i.e. if it reduces the
total cost of crime). Therefore, we focus on amnesties such that ˜A.fiA; s A/ • ˜N .fiN /.
Comparing the level of enforcement chosen in the no-amnesty case .fiN / and that chosen
in the anticipated amnesty case .fiA/ yields no clear cut results given the current level of
generality. It is also difficult to assess whether the constraint s ‚ 0 will be binding. To
obtain results, we therefore take two directions. First, we obtain some analytical results
by making a number of assumptions regarding the parameters and the functions of the
model. The results obtained support the view that enforcement should be increased when
an amnesty is introduced. Second, we performed numerical simulations and we report
cases in which a smaller level of enforcement, relative to the no-amnesty situation, can be
efficient when an amnesty is anticipated.
4.3. Analytical Results: Case Where the Distribution of Gain is Uniform
Assume that ° D 0. Hence, if an individual does not participate in the amnesty but is
later apprehended, nothing is recovered and the net and gross social costs are the same (no
co-operation). Also assume that g is uniformly distributed on [g‘; gh]. Then, it is possible
to show the following:
Proposition 1 If the probability distribution of g is uniform, ° D 0, and fl ‚ Nfl D ‚= Nµ ,
then s D 0 and the amnesty is optimal.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Thus, under the above parameterization, an amnesty is efficient and the reduced sanction
is zero. When g is uniformly distributed, the efficient reduced sanction is one of the two
corner solutions, s D 0 or s D S. When fl is large enough (high co-operation), an important
portion of the social cost of crimes is recovered and the amnesty is efficient. Under these
circumstances, the authority would like to induce as many criminals as possible to participate
in the amnesty. This incentive is provided by setting the lowest possible reduced sanction,
s D 0. On the other hand, if fl < Nfl, co-operation is too low to justify an amnesty, and
setting s D S ensures that no one participates in it.
Proposition 2 If the probability distribution of g is uniform, ° D 0, and fl ‚ Nfl D ‚= Nµ ,
then fiA ‚ fiN .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Thus, there exists theoretical support for increasing enforcement when an amnesty is
anticipated. But we now show that for more general distribution of gain, this result does
not necessarily hold. Moreover, an interior reduced sanction may obtain.
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Table 1. Efficient policies.
Example 1: ‚ D 1=4; q D 1=4; ° D 0; fl D 1
fiN D 1:32 ˜N D 1:34 Og D 0:32
fiA D 1:19; s A D 0:03 ˜A D 1:21 Mg D 0:25; Qg D 0:81
Example 2: ‚ D 1=2; q D 3=4; ° D 0; fl D 1
fiN D 1:40 ˜N D 1:09 Og D 0:45
fiA D 1:37; s A D 0 ˜A D 1:03 Mg D 0:27; Qg D 0:54
Example 3: ‚ D 1=4; q D 1=4; ° D 1=4; fl D 1=2
fiN D 1:32 ˜N D 1:32 Og D 0:32
fiA D 1:30; s A D 0:08 ˜A D 1:31 Mg D 0:29; Qg D 0:67
4.4. Numerical Results: Case Where the Distribution of Gain is General
To obtain the above results, we simplified the objective function, in particular, by simplifying
the distribution of g. However, we can numerically simulate a richer model. Hence, we
worked out a number of examples. Suppose that:
† The probability that a criminal is caught is fi=.10C fi/; This is slightly different from
the case considered in section 4.3 (where the probability of apprehension is simply fi),
but it ensures that in our numerical simulations, this probability lies in the interval [0,1);
† The cost of enforcement function is C.fi/ D .1=2/fi2, which is increasing and convex;
† The gains g follow a Beta distribution on the interval [0,1]; The parameters of the
Beta distribution, .a; b/, are set to (1,2) implying a decreasing cumulative distribution
function.24
† Depending on the example, the value of the bad shock is ‚ 2 f1=4; 1=2g (i.e. the value
of a criminal’s gain is reduced by 75% or 50% if he suffers the bad shock) and it occurs
with probability q 2 f1=4; 3=4g;
† The criminal sanction if caught is S D 2;
† The social cost of a crime is Z D 2, which is twice as large as the largest private gain;
† The degree of co-operation of a criminal when caught is ° 2 f0; 1=4g; Thus, either
catching a criminal does not allow society to recover any portion of the social cost of
crime, or it allows to recover 25% of it;
† The degree of co-operation of individuals participating in the amnesty is fl 2 f1=2; 1g.
In Table 1, we report the efficient policies for different values of the parameters. Note
that in these three examples, g is not uniformly distributed so that Proposition 1 and 2 do
not apply. Also note that in all examples, introducing an amnesty is desirable.
It can be seen that in all examples, it is efficient to have less enforcement when an amnesty
is anticipated relative to the no-amnesty situation .fiA < fiN /. To understand the intuition of
such a possibility, it is useful to consider an example closely. In Example 1, if there was no
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amnesty, the authority would select fiN D 1:32. This choice would translate into Og D 0:32
so that 45.4% of the population would become (and remain) criminals.25 The total cost of
crime would be 1.32.26 Now consider what happens in the case of an anticipated amnesty.
If participants in the amnesty are very co-operative, then what matters when setting fi is
really the number of criminals post-amnesty. Our calculations show that the efficient level
of enforcement when an amnesty is anticipated is fiA D 1:19. This in turn implies that
Mg D 0:25 so that 56.1% of the population initially become criminals. It turns out that after
criminals have participated in the amnesty (all those that have g in the interval [0.25,0.81]
and that suffer a bad shock will), we are left with 42.9% of the population that remain
criminals. This is less than in the no-amnesty situation and it has been achieved with a
lower level of enforcement. Hence, we obtain a lower total cost of 1.21. The anticipated
amnesty is therefore efficient.
The reason why the efficient level of enforcement can be lower when an amnesty is
anticipated is that despite the increase in the initial number of criminals brought by an
anticipated amnesty, many criminals eventually participate in the amnesty and those par-
ticipants can be very co-operative (fl large) so that a large proportion of the social cost is
recovered. Moreover, even with less enforcement, the number of criminals post-amnesty
can be smaller than that in the no-amnesty situation, thereby diminishing the return on
further enforcement. Thus, when individuals co-operate a lot when participating in an
amnesty, it is not necessarily efficient to have more enforcement relative to the no-amnesty
level.
Comparing Example 2 and 3 to Example 1 is useful to better understand the determination
of the level of the reduced sanction s. Starting from the parameters of Example 1 and moving
to those of Example 2, note that a simultaneous increase in ‚ and q (i.e. the bad shock is
not as bad but it occurs more frequently) such that the expected shock Nµ is reduced (recall
that Nµ D q‚ C 1 ¡ q) leads to a reduction in s. This is due to the fact that the reduction
in Nµ reduces the expected payoff from criminal activity. At the same time, the increase
in frequency of the bad shock implies that criminals are more likely to participate in the
amnesty. These two effects reduce the marginal benefit of s (see equation (10)), and thus its
optimal level. In the example, the optimal s would be negative so that the constraint s ‚ 0
is binding.
Now comparing Example 1 and 3, note that in the latter, the level of co-operation of
criminals that are caught increases while that of those that participate in the amnesty is
decreased. These changes imply that the benefit of having criminals participating in the
amnesty relative to that of catching them is reduced. As a consequence, it is profitable for
the authority to decrease the number of participants in the amnesty (increase in s A) but to
increase the number of criminals that will be caught (increase in fiA).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have taken explicit account of the possible co-operation with the authorities
of individuals participating in an amnesty. We have characterized the efficient level of
enforcement in the case of no-amnesty and in the case of an anticipated amnesty. We have
shown that the latter may be larger, but that this is not guaranteed. We have also shown
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that the efficient reduced sanction imposed on participants in an amnesty may be zero or
positive.
Other factors that could enrich the analysis and that should be considered in future research
are: Studying amnesties offered to criminals who have already been convicted; Introducing
various information asymmetries or uncertainties making the decision to participate in the
amnesty less obvious (unknown probability of detection, unknown sanctions, etc.); Dealing
with the possibility that an authority cannot commit to some levels of the sanction or not
to use the information provided by the participation in the amnesty (ratchet effect). These
topics have received almost no attention in previous work.
7. Appendix
Proposition 1 If the probability distribution of g is uniform, ° D 0, and fl ‚ Nfl D ‚= Nµ ,
then s D 0 and the amnesty is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we have to prove that s D 0. The proof simply consists in
evaluating the first order condition (10a) when ° D 0, and f .g/ D f 8g:
qfl
‚
¡ .1¡ qfl/ q
.1¡ q/ ‚ 0: (A.1)
The constraint s ‚ 0 is not binding when condition (A.1) is satisfied with equality. Conse-
quently, this constraint is binding, and s D 0, only if fl ‚ Nfl D ‚= Nµ .
We will now prove that the total cost differential between the case with and without
amnesty is zero at fl D Nfl, and that this differential decreases (becomes negative) when fl
increases above Nfl. As a first step, denote by A.fiN / the left-hand side of equation (9) (the
first-order condition on fi in the presence of an amnesty) when evaluated at fl D Nfl and
fi D fiN (recall that fiN solves equation (7)). We have the following:
A.fiN / D C
0.fiN /
Z
¡ S [1¡ q
Nfl ¡ .1¡ q/° fiN ] f . Mg.fiN ; 0//
.1¡ fiN /2
¡ q S[
Nfl ¡ °fiN ] f . Qg.fiN ; 0//
‚.1¡ fiN /2 ¡ ° [1¡ q F. Qg.fi
N ; 0//
¡ .1¡ q/F. Mg.fiN ; 0//] (A.2)
Using equation (7), ° D 0 and f .g/ D f; 8g; A.fiN / can be rewritten as:
A.fiN / D
•
1
Nµ ¡ .1¡ q
Nfl/¡ q
Nfl
‚
‚
S f
.1¡ fiN /2 (A.3)
With Nfl D ‚= Nµ , we can show that A.fiN / D 0. This implies that fiA D fiN when fl D Nfl.
Now let 1.fiA; fiN / D ˜A.fiA; s A/ ¡ ˜N .fiN / be the total cost differential between the
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case with and without an amnesty:
1.fiA; fiN / D C.fiA/¡ C.fiN /C Z
Z gh
Mg.fiA;0/
f .g/ dg ¡ qflZ
Z Qg.fiA;0/
Mg.fiA;0/
f .g/dg
¡ .1¡ q/fiA° Z
Z Qg.fiA;0/
Mg.fiA;0/
f .g/ dg ¡ fiA° Z
Z gh
Qg.fiA;0/
f .g/ dg
¡
Z gh
Og.fiN /
[1¡ °fiN ]Z f .g/ dg (A.4)
When ° D 0, fl D Nfl, and f .g/ D f , 8g, we get:
1.fiA; fiN / D
•
1
Nµ ¡ .1¡ q
Nfl/¡ q
Nfl
‚
‚
S f fiA
.1¡ fiA/ (A.5)
Routine manipulations yield that .1= Nµ/¡ .1¡q Nfl/¡ .q Nfl=‚/ D 0. Thus,1.fiA; fiN / D 0 at
fl D Nfl, and we can conclude that at such a level of co-operation, the authority is indifferent
between declaring an amnesty or not (we assume that the authority offers the amnesty in
that case). An increase in fl does not affect the total cost for the case without an amnesty.
However, using the Envelop theorem, it is possible to show that an increase in fl leads to a
decrease in the total cost for the case with an amnesty. Therefore, for any fl > Nfl, the total
cost differential becomes negative. In such circumstances, the amnesty is optimal.
Proposition 2 If the probability distribution of g is uniform, ° D 0, and fl ‚ Nfl D ‚= Nµ ,
then fiA ‚ fiN .
Proof of Proposition 2: We already showed that A.fiN / D 0. Using equation (A.3)
above, it is possible to show that A.fiN / is decreasing in fl. Since A.fiN / D 0 at Nfl, A.fiN /
will be negative if evaluated at any value of fl > Nfl. Because the second order conditions
are assumed to hold, the total cost function is strictly convex, and we can conclude that
fiA > fiN for fl > Nfl.
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Notes
1. Twenty-eight states offered amnesty programs for income tax evasion between December 1981 and March 31,
1990, according to Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1992).
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2. According to Leonard and Zeckhauser (1987), Philadelphia collected over 160 000 volumes in a one-week
library amnesty held in 1983.
3. On 21 January 1977, President Jimmy Carter gave an amnesty for Vietnam war draft evaders (but not military
deserters).
4. Indeed, following the election of Jacques Chirac in May 1995, an amnesty was given on 28 June 1995 that
included violations to the traffic code (parking and moving) and to the labor laws, as well as all individuals
sentenced to less than three months of prison (Le Monde, 22 June 1995, p. 9, and 30 June 1995, p. 7). The
amnesty given by Fracc¸ois Mitterand in 1981 included all individuals sentenced to less than six months and it
lead to the release of 23% of all French prisoners (Le Devoir, 7 June 1995, p. 1). Note that despite the constant
decline in the number of car accidents in France, the number of car accidents and of car accident victims has
risen dramatically in the last three presidential years (1981, 1988, 1995) (Le Devoir, 7 June 1995, p. 1).
5. Going through several years of Tax News Service and European Taxation, we found that fiscal amnesties were
given in the following 21 countries (year in which it was held in parenthesis): Argentina (1956, 1961, 1968,
1976, 1986, 1989), Australia (1985), Austria (1983), Bangladesh (1989), Brazil (1982), Chile (1984, 1991),
Columbia (1986, 1990), France (1986), Guatemala (1990), Indonesia (1981, 1984), Iran (1983), Italy (1963,
1966, 1980, 1989), Nicaragua (1990), Panama (1990), Paraguay (1990), Peru (1971), Phillipines (1972, 1975,
1981), San Salvador (1990), Switzerland (1968), Thailand (1985, 1991), and West Germany (1989).
6. Amnesties have other benefits. For example, for a given level of resources devoted to detection, the probability
of detecting a criminal typically decreases over time. With an amnesty, a portion of the “old” crimes are solved.
Effort in detection, therefore, becomes more efficient as it is targeted to more recent crimes. Another benefit
is that an individual who participates in an amnesty reveals some of his characteristics. This information can
be used later on by the authority and make enforcement cheaper. This benefit is often mentioned in the case
of tax amnesties.
7. They mention some more costs and benefits of tax amnesties specifically.
8. In India, tax amnesties took place in 1965–66, 1975–76, 1980–81, 1985–87, and 1990–91. Das-Gupta and
Mookherjee (1995) were able to show that the level of compliance with tax laws decreased in pre-amnesty
years for the post-1980 amnesties.
9. There are also amnesties in which the authority reduces the sanction of criminals which have already been
convicted.
10. In this case, the social cost comes from the larger tax rate that has to be imposed on those who pay their taxes;
this assumes that the marginal cost of public funds increases when the tax rate increases.
11. Considering the case of tax evasion, it is possible to justify that fl ‚ ° as follows. When a tax evader is
caught through an audit, he has an incentive to continue to hide income because he will have to pay the fine
and taxes on any income that is discovered. On the other hand, the incentive to continue to hide income is less
for a participant in an amnesty because he only has to pay the taxes on the income originally hidden (usually,
participants pay no fine). Because more taxes should be recovered from a participant in the amnesty than from
an audited individual, we conclude that fl ‚ ° .
12. Co-operation is sometimes a condition for participation in the amnesty.
13. The net social cost of crime is the social cost of all crimes less the portion of it that is recovered because
criminals are caught or because some individuals participate in the amnesty.
14. Note that the probability of detection is independent of the number of criminals. This approach is correct when
individuals, not crimes, are the object of investigation. For example, tax evaders are usually identified through
an audit of a random sample of the population of all taxpayers (both the honest and the dishonest ones). This
assumption is standard in the economics of crime.
15. This assumption is without consequences.
16. On regret, see Cooter (1991).
17. Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) argue that an authority can commit to a level of monitoring by setting up an
agency (e.g. the IRS) responsible for the enforcement of law.
18. A criminal that has drawn a good realization of the shock, µ D 1, will not participate in the amnesty because
y C .1 ¡ fi/g ¡ fiS > y ¡ s holds. The last inequality can be obtained as follows. First note that an agent
will choose to commit a crime only if his expected utility from doing so is larger than that of not committing
it: E[U C ] ‚ y. Second, note that by the definition of Nµ , the following holds: y C .1 ¡ fi/g ¡ fiS >
y C .1¡ fi/ Nµg ¡ fiS D E[U C ]. Combining those inequalities yield y C .1¡ fi/g ¡ fiS > y > y ¡ s, which
is the desired result.
19. If it is efficient to offer an amnesty, then the efficient parameters will be such that this inequality is satisfied.
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20. See Shavell (1991) and Mookherjee and Png (1992) (and the references therein) for explanations of why
efficient sanctions are not necessarily maximal.
21. In the current analysis, the authority is minimizing the total cost of crime, which has no implication for the
weight given to various individuals. In particular, this objective function does not imply that the weight given
to criminals is zero. Our results could be obtained with a utilitarian social welfare function (putting an equal
weight on all individuals, whether honest or criminals), albeit at the cost of introducing some more simplifying
assumptions.
22. Throughout, we assume that second order conditions are satisfied. This simply requires a sufficiently large
C 00.fi/.
23. Note that it would be possible to reward criminals for their participation in the amnesty .s < 0/. But it would
not be difficult to build a model in which a lower bound must be set on s for the legal system to maintain its
credibility. For simplicity, we decided not to model this phenomenon explicitly, and we restricted the analysis
to the case where s ‚ 0.
24. See Johnson and Kotz (1970, ch. 24) for a discussion on the Beta distribution. Note that our results are robust
to some (but not all) changes in those parameters.
25. In the examples, the number of criminals may seem unreasonably large. By assuming that individuals with
non-negative gains from crime represent only, say, 10% of the population (the remaining obtaining a negative
payoff from crime), the crime rate would fall from 45.4% to 4.54%. Note that for consistency with the rest
of the analysis, the authority should then be able to identify at no cost all the individuals that would obtain a
negative payoff from crime.
26. Note that without enforcement, the total cost is 2. If the optimum with enforcement leads to a total cost larger
than 2, then the authority will prefer to undertake no enforcement.
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